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SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERATIONS AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN THE WAKE OF INDIA’S RECENT 
SODOMY CASES 
 
Deepa Das Acevedo* 
 
American constitutional law scholars have long questioned whether courts can 
really drive social reform, and this position remains largely unchallenged even in 
the wake of recent landmark decisions affecting the LGBT community. In 
contrast, court watchers in India—spurred by developments in a special type of 
legal action developed in the late 1970s known as “public interest litigation,” or 
“PIL”—have only recently begun questioning the judiciary’s ability to promote 
progressive social change. Indian scholarship on this point has veered between 
despair that PIL cases no longer reliably produce good outcomes for India’s most 
disadvantaged, and optimism that public interest litigation can be returned to its 
glory days of heroic judicial intervention. And no pair of cases so nicely captures 
this dichotomy as the 2009 decision in Naz Foundation, which decriminalized 
sodomy, and the 2012 decision in Suresh Kumar Koushal, which overruled 
Naz. This paper uses public interest litigation and India’s recent sodomy cases to 
demonstrate that the relationship between state actors (like courts) and society is 
often far less stable than the democratic ideal of “citizen sovereignty” would 
suggest. 
 I argue, first, that supporters of public interest litigation should neither 
give up on PIL suits as a means of effecting social reform nor imagine that PIL 
suits can ever reliably produce desirable outcomes. As a type of legal action, public 
interest litigation simply cannot be reverse engineered in this way. But second, I 
reinterpret the documented and widely critiqued shift in PIL cases from protecting 
fundamental rights during the 1970s and ‘80s to protecting the interests of 
advantaged litigants in the 1990s and 2000s. While earlier PIL cases reflect the 
Indian Constitution’s commitment to government-led social reform and the sharing 
of sovereignty between citizens and the state, contemporary PIL cases reflect the 
Constitution’s commitment to an agency theory of sovereignty whereby government 
merely acts on behalf of citizens. Because neither vision of sovereignty is paramount 
over the long run, shifts in public interest litigation reflect the productive and 
dynamic equilibrium between the two. 
                                                
* Sharswood Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School. AB, Princeton 
(2006); PhD, University of Chicago (2013); JD, University of Chicago 
(2016). My thanks to John Comaroff and participants in the 2012 Law and 
Social Sciences Research Network Conference in Pune, India for their 
suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper and, as always, to John F. 
Acevedo.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea of legal liberalism—that courts can be the means of 
progressive social change—has been on something of a roller-coaster 
ride in the United States. Scholars documenting the ups and downs 
of this journey usually begin with the rise of legal realism toward the 
end of the nineteenth century and the subsequent development of 
legal process theory, then focus on the Warren Court and the 
Supreme Court’s conservative turn in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
usually taper off around the rise of neo-republican theory in the 
1980s and 90s.1  Most recently, Obergefell 2  and its precursors have 
prompted some commentators—usually critics3—to argue that the 
Court is once again acting as an agent of social change, although this 
view has been rejected by other commentators across the political 
                                                
1 On the definition of legal liberalism, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER 
OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996) (calling it “trust in the potential of courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about ‘those specific social reforms that 
affect large groups of people such as blacks, or workers, or women, or partisans of 
a particular persuasion; in other words, policy chance with nationwide impact’”). 
2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015). See also KALMAN, supra note 1, at 88 
(noting that “by 1980, legal liberalism was feeble”). 
3 See, e.g., David Upham, Symposium: A tremendous defeat for “We the People” and our 
posterity, SCOTUSblog (Jun. 26, 2015, 4:26 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-a-tremendous-defeat-for-we-
the-people-and-our-posterity/ (arguing that “it [cannot] plausibly be said that the 
people at large have generally demanded today’s result. As the Court noted, the 
states and the people remain deeply divided”). 
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spectrum.4 For the most part, American legal liberalism has been 
having a rough time of it for around three decades. 
Of course, whether or not courts can—and should—be 
agents of social reform is hardly a uniquely American debate. Similar 
conversations occur among scholars of Israeli law in regards to the 
successfulness and desirability of “values-based” judging.5 They are 
also common among Canadian Charter scholars on either side of the 
“court-party thesis,” according to which citizen interest groups drive 
judicial interpretation of the Charter and “judges drive the Charter, not 
vice versa.”6 
                                                
4 See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, 2 THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2008). See also Stephen M. Feldman, (Same) Sex, 
Lies, and Democracy: Tradition, Religion, and Substantive Due Process (with an 
Emphasis on Obergefell v. Hodges), 24 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 341, 351 
(2015) (“Supreme Court decisions, including Obergefell, do not wield sufficient 
power to change society independently of other societal and cultural forces.”); Kyle 
C. Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 Houston L. Rev. Off Rec. 157, 161 
(2015–16) (“Because Obergefell’s holding—“[t]he nugget that will have binding 
precedential effect”—is narrow, it will not regulate behavior outside of marriage. It 
will not prohibit discrimination against LGBT individuals in other contexts. Thus, 
the promise that Obergefell holds to effect broad, positive change—to propel the law 
toward formal equality—is in its expressive power.”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 
2014–15 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9 (2014–15) (arguing that “The result [in Obergefell] 
was wholly expected given the rapid shifts in popular opinion on the subject, as 
well as the Court’s ruling on the Defense of Marriage Act two years ago in United 
States v. Windsor”). 
5 On “values-based judging,” see, e.g., MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE 
CULTURE OF ISRAEL 38 (2011) (critically describing the “courts as agents of liberal 
values”); Aharon Barak, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democracy, 33 ISR. L. REV 1, 
3 (1999) (“In the creation of judicial law—a product of judicial discretion—the 
judge gives expression to the basic values of the legal system… The values which 
direct the judge… are not the results of public-opinion surveys, nor of populism 
which sweeps the masses… Indeed, when society is not faithful to itself, the judge 
is not obliged to give expression to the fleeting winds of the hour”). On the role of 
courts in effecting social change, compare Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role 
of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 46–47 (Fac. Scholarship Series, Paper No. 3692, 
2002) (arguing, in contrast to ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2008) that “I do 
not claim that the court can cure every ill of society, nor do I claim that it can be the 
primary agent for social change”) (emphasis mine) with Ruth Gavison, The Role of 
Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 ISR. L. REV. 216, 233 (1999) (arguing, in agreement 
with ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE, that “courts have neither purses nor 
swords … they must rely on the cooperation and the good will of the other powers 
to positively implement their decisions. When such cooperation is not forthcoming, 
the court's decision remains ineffective”). 
6 See, e.g., Lise Gotell, Book Review, 9 QUEEN’S L. J. 843, 896 (2005) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN THE SUPREME COURT: 
LEGAL MOBILIZATION AND THE WOMEN’S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION 
FUND (2004) and noting that Manfredi acknowledges that “there is no necessary 
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Like the United States, India is experiencing something of a 
downward adjustment in the way scholars, lawyers, and judges think 
of court-driven progressive change, but the context and implications 
of this shift are hugely and necessarily distinct. Let’s begin with some 
constitutional prose. Comparative analyses of the Indian and 
American constitutions have usually characterized the former as 
“militant” and the latter as “acquiescent” in terms of the relationship 
they envision between the state and society.7 In this narrative, India’s 
founding document sets up a state that seeks to reform society by 
challenging old practices and affirming new rights. Conversely, the 
American Constitution seeks merely to preserve the status quo and 
establish negative rights in the mode of classical liberalism. 8 
Unsurprisingly, then, signs that legal liberalism may be on the wane 
carry a different and arguably a more dispiriting significance in India.  
To be sure, there are great problems with this way of talking 
about constitutions in general and about the Indian Constitution in 
particular.9 An important goal of this paper is to add one more data 
point in support of the argument that Indian constitutional 
jurisprudence actually and appropriately reflects a “dynamic 
equilibrium” between two very different visions of state-society 
relations, rather than being straightforwardly committed to state-led 
reform.10 Each of these visions of state-society relations corresponds 
to an understanding of how sovereignty works in a democracy. Some 
elements of the Indian Constitution reflect a fairly conventional 
                                                                                                         
connection between favourable legal change, positive policy consequences, social 
conditions and movement building” and that “[d]rawing on Rosenberg's work, 
Manfredi complicates his doctrinal analysis of feminist influence by analyzing 
litigation and legal decisions as part of a broader process of social and political 
mobilization”); F.L. Morton, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party, 30 OSGOODE 
HALL L. J. 627, 630 (1992). 
7 GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 216 (2010). 
8 But see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (1967) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution was not primarily 
influenced by negative rights in the classical liberal mode and that the status quo 
the revolutionaries were seeking to preserve was an older, non-property-based 
conception of Englishmen’s rights).  
9 See, e.g., PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS 203 (1993) 
(“The state was connected to the people-nation not simply through the procedural 
forms of representative government; it also acquired its representativeness by 
directing a program of economic development on behalf of the nation…The two 
connections did not necessarily have the same implications for a state trying to 
determine how to use its sovereign powers”).  
10 Deepa Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium in the Indian 
Constitution, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. __ (2016). 
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 4 
“agency” view of governmental authority,11 while others envision 
such an active or “militant” role for government that it is difficult to 
view the state as merely the agent of the sovereign people.12 Since 
neither of these visions of sovereignty is—or is meant to be—
paramount over the long run, they exist in a perpetual and dynamic 
equilibrium with one another. Part III will briefly describe these two 
visions and explain how they are borne up by the specific aspect of 
Indian law, public interest litigation, that’s at issue here. 
A second reason why a decline in legal liberalism has different 
implications for India is that the history of court-driven change (rather 
than merely state or law-driven change) as well as the public reception 
of such change have been markedly different there.13 While Indian 
courts have always had an important role in advancing and upholding 
progressive policies, they have been especially prominent since the 
rise of public interest litigation in the 1970s. Unlike in the United 
States, where “public interest law” refers to any legal work or 
advocacy done for the greater good or for those who cannot afford 
representation,14 Indian “public interest litigation” (PIL) is a distinct 
way of articulating a legal complaint, much like filing an individual 
civil suit is different from filing a class action or an administrative 
grievance.15 Framing a complaint as a PIL suit allows petitioners to 
                                                
11 Das Acevedo, supra note 10, at __  (describing how many contract theories of 
democracy view sovereignty “like an object whose ownership can’t really be 
shared” but which needs to be delegated from “the people” to their representatives 
for the purposes of effective governance). 
12 Das Acevedo, supra note 10, at __ (arguing that the Indian Constitution 
“envisions a state with huge independent discretion to control social ordering” and 
that “[h]aving that kind of discretion baked right into one’s constitutional cake 
means that sovereignty can’t wholly owned by citizens: it has to be shared by both 
citizens and the state”). 
13 See, e.g., K.G. Balakrishnan, Chief Justice of India, Fifteenth Annual Lecture at 
the Singapore Academy of Law (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author):  
The main rationale for ‘judicial activism’ in India lies in the highly unequal 
social profile of our population, where judges must take proactive steps to 
protect the interests of those who do not have a voice in the political system 
and do not have the means or information to move the Courts. This places the 
Indian Courts in a very different social role as compared to several developed 
nations where directions given by ‘unelected judges’ are often viewed as 
unjustified restraints on the will of the majority.  
14 See, e.g., What is Public Interest Law?, HLS.HARVARD.EDU, 
http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/opia/what-is-public-interest-law/ (last visited Jan. 31, 
2016) (defining public interest law by practice setting, work type, and issue area, 
among other things). 
15 On public interest litigation see generally, Ashok H. Desai & S. Muralidhar, Public 
Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE 159 (B.N. 
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avoid traditional standing requirements (like personal harm) and 
briefing requirements (like the submission of formal writ petitions) in 
the interests of removing barriers to justice for the most 
disadvantaged.16 Additionally, courts hearing PIL suits often act as 
quasi-arbitrators, conduct independent fact-finding, and require 
periodic progress reports from the parties.17 And not infrequently, 
courts themselves instigate PIL “suits” by taking suo motu cognizance of 
specific issues.18 
Given these striking features and the stack of extremely 
progressive PIL cases that were decided early on—as well as a 
growing sense that India’s executive and legislative branches are 
incapable of governing—it’s no wonder that public interest litigation 
is increasingly viewed as a crucial tool for a Court focused on “good 
governance.”19 Simultaneously, however, PIL cases have become a 
popular tool for petitioners pursuing urban, middle-class, or socially 
conservative ends—so much so, in fact, that contemporary 
                                                                                                         
Kirpal et. al. eds., 2000); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in 
India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495 (1989); Rajeev Dhavan, 
Whose Law, Whose Interest, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW (Jeremy Cooper & Rajeev 
Dhavan eds., 1986); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976). 
16 On standing, see Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, 2 S.C.C. 
308 (1983) (an early classic in public interest litigation that featured a famous law 
professor petitioning on behalf of the residents of a women’s home). On briefing, 
see Khatri v. State of Bihar, 1981 A.I.R. (S.C.) 928, 1 S.C.C. 623 (another 
benchmark case, in which a lawyer forwarded a newspaper article detailing prison 
abuses to the Supreme Court and the Court treated the article as a writ petition). 
Khatri and its companion cases at 1 S.C.C. 627 and 1 S.C.C. 635 are collectively 
known as the “Bhagalpur Blinding Cases” and gave rise to what is commonly 
known in India as “epistolary jurisdiction.” Susan D. Susman, Distant Voices in the 
Court of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation, 13 WIS. INT’L L. J. 
54, 58 n. 3 (1994-95).  
17 See, e.g., Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1988 
S.C. 2187 in which the Court appointed expert committees to determine whether 
mining in the Doon Valley had adverse environmental impact and also created a 
monitoring committee which continued to oversee “quarrying and mining 
operations in the Valley even more than a decade after the final disposal of the case 
in 1988”). Videh Upadhyay, Changing Judicial Power: Courts on Infrastructure Projects and 
Environment, 35 ECON. & POL. WKLY 3789, 3790 (2000).  
18 Marc Galanter & Vasujith Ram, Suo Moto Intervention and the Indian Judiciary 
(Sept. 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
19 Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (discussing the “Court’s 
development of two new tools—the basic structure doctrine and its expanded right 
to life jurisprudence—to address…apparent failings of representative 
governance”).  
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scholarship on public interest litigation is overwhelmingly 
preoccupied with asking if this much beloved hallmark of Indian 
jurisprudence can be saved or even defended.20  
Few cases better reflect the shifting tone of public interest 
litigation and of legal liberalism in India than the 2009 opinion in Naz 
Foundation 21  that decriminalized sodomy and the 2013 Koushal 22 
decision that reversed Naz. Both were PIL suits; the first was filed in 
the Delhi High Court by an NGO focusing on HIV/AIDS and 
sexual health issues, while the second was filed in the Supreme Court 
by lead petitioners described as “citizens of India who believe they 
have the moral responsibility and duty in protecting cultural values of 
Indian society.”23 Read together, Naz and Koushal express the primary 
argument of this paper—at once narrow and extremely contentious 
(at least among scholars of Indian law)—that public interest litigation 
can never reliably advance certain kinds of progressive outcomes. 
To be perfectly clear, I am not just saying that PIL cases have 
increasingly produced outcomes favoring advantaged litigants. This 
descriptive argument has already been made, with excellent empirical 
support and in many different areas of the law, by several lawyers and 
legal academics.24 Nor am I advocating any particular way of “fixing” 
                                                
20 Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in SUPREME 
BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 
107 (B.N. Kirpal et al eds., 2008); Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Pro-Human Rights but 
Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme Court from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 18 HUM. RTS REV. 157, 158 (2007) (arguing that “the Court’s activism 
increasingly manifests several biases – in favor of the state and development, in 
favor of the rich and against workers, in favor of the urban middle-class and against 
rural farmers”); SHOBHA AGGARWAL, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION HOAX: 
TRUTH BEFORE THE NATION: A CITIZEN’S REPORT ON HOW PIL FAILS TO 
PROVIDE JUSTICE TO THOSE WHO NEED IT MOST (2005) (arguing that public 
interest litigation has faltered because of the Supreme Court’s shift away from 
principles of “natural justice”); Prashant Bhushan, Supreme Court and PIL: Changing 
Perspectives Under Liberalisation, 39 ECON. & POL. WKLY 18 (2004) 
21 Naz Foundation v. Government of NCT of Delhi, Writ Petition (Civil) No.7455 
of 2001 (henceforth Naz). 
22 Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation, Civil Appeal No. 10972 of 2013 
(henceforth Koushal). 
23 Id. at 15. 
24 Varun Gauri & Poorvi Chitalkar, The Distributional Impact of Public Interest 
Litigation in the Indian Supreme Court—an Update (unpublished conference 
paper) (Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with author); Varun Gauri, Public Interest Litigation 
in India: Overreaching or Underachieving?, World Bank Pol’y Rsrch Working 
Paper 5109 (Nov. 2009) (on file with author); SHYLASHRI SHANKAR, SCALING 
JUSTICE: INDIA’S SUPREME COURT, ANTI-TERROR LAWS, AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 
(2009); Rakesh Shukla, Rights of the Poor: An Overview of Supreme Court, 41 ECON. & 
POL. WEEKLY 3755 (2006). 
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public interest litigation such that it returns to its early focus on 
removing barriers to justice, expanding or enforcing constitutional 
rights, and resolving group-based disadvantages. Packing the Indian 
Supreme Court with 1980s-style activist justices or urging sitting 
justices to abandon their “command-and-control” model of case 
management for a more “facilitative” one are, I think, equally 
unrealistic options and unlikely to restore public interest litigation’s 
focus on the country’s most marginalized citizens.25 Indeed, if the only 
thing that will resuscitate the worth of public interest litigation is the 
kind of rights-enforcing opinions common during the first 10–15 
years of PIL history (perhaps augmented by the lessons in alternative 
dispute resolution learned since then), I am quite doubtful there is 
anything we can concertedly do.  
But this—despite the heartbreaking outcome in Koushal—may 
not be as bad as it sounds. For one thing, a few recent opinions 
suggest that public interest litigation isn’t, in a purely consequentialist 
sense, already a lost cause.26  More importantly, the kind of court-
driven progressive social reform captured in the early PIL cases, vital 
and thrilling as it is, is only half the story of democratic governance in 
India. Even state-driven reform, however rights-enhancing it may be, 
does not so define Indian democracy that the periodic (or even 
somewhat frequent) failure of PIL cases to achieve progressive 
outcomes spells decay and doom. Rather, it is the dynamic interplay 
between a fairly conventional, citizen-sovereignty vision of 
democratic government and a more unusual support for state- (and 
court-) led reform that gives Indian democracy the flexibility it needs 
to survive over the long run.  
                                                
25 Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a Bitter PIL? Reflections on Progressive Strategies 
for Public Interest Litigation in India, in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: 
COMPARING THE APEX COURTS OF BRAZIL, INDIA, AND SOUTH AFRICA 519, 522 
(Oscar Vilhena et al. eds., 2013); Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Revisiting The Role of the 
Judiciary in Plural Societies (1987): A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Public Interest 
Litigation in India and the Global South, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
SOUTH ASIA 341, 362-65 (Sunil Khilnani et al. eds., 2013). 
26 See, e.g., National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 
No. 604 of 2013 (Apr. 15, 2014), available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=41411 (establishing legal 
recognition for a “third gender” and directing national and state governments to 
create reservations for third gender individuals in educational institutions and 
public employment); and Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & 
Others, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 196 of 2001 (Nov. 28, 2001), available at 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/orders/nov28.html (requiring state governments 
to provide every child attending a government or government-aided primary school 
with a free, cooked midday meal). 
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Because public interest litigation is this paper’s window into 
the relationship between courts, social change, and sovereignty, Part I 
overviews the belief in the ameliorative potential of PIL suits as well 
as recent disillusionment on that front. Part II zeroes in on Naz and 
Koushal, spending some time on the reasoning in each case as well as 
paying special attention to the kind of “public morality” envisioned in 
each decision. Part III briefly summarizes the idea of dynamic 
equilibrium as a theory of constitutional identity and design before 
exploring how the overall changes in PIL outcomes (discussed in Part 
I) and the specific outcomes in Naz and Koushal (discussed in Part II) 
exemplify that structure. For the legal liberals among us, describing 
Indian constitutional jurisprudence and public interest litigation this 
way should be both reassuring and worrisome: PIL cases may not be 
failing progressives as much as is commonly feared, but they were 
never meant to be sure-fire tools of reform either.   
 
I. PUBLIC CONFUSION OVER PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
 
Indian lawyers and law scholars generally describe the initial 
period of Supreme Court PIL suits—roughly, the late 1970s through 
early 1990s—in the language of heroic judicial intervention. 27  A 
former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court called it “a potent 
weapon” and an example of how “[j]udicial creativity… has enabled 
realisation of the promise of socio-economic justice made in the 
Preamble to the Constitution of India.”28 A Supreme Court attorney 
described public interest litigation as the product of “two justices… 
[who] recognised the possibility of providing access to justice to the 
                                                
27 The Indian Supreme Court is a court of original jurisdiction for plaintiffs who 
assert fundamental rights violations. CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part III: 
Fundamental Rights, art. 32(1). It’s also generally believed that public interest 
litigation as a means of vindicating fundamental rights conforms to Article 39(A), 
located in the non-justiceable “Directive Principles” section of the Constitution. 
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part IV: Directive Principles of State Policy, art. 39(A). 
(“The State shall secure that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on 
a basis of equal opportunity, and shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by 
suitable legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that opportunities for 
securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other 
disabilities.”).  Although PIL suits can also be heard by High Courts and many 
important PIL cases have been decided by High Courts, scholarly debates over 
public interest litigation have overwhelmingly focused on the Supreme Court. 
28 Justice Dr A.S. Anand, Judicial Review – Judicial Activism – Need for Caution, in LAW 
& JUSTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 383 (Soli J. Sorabjee ed., 2004).  
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poor and the exploited people by relaxing the rules of standing.”29 
And this sentiment is not unwarranted: early PIL cases forced 
negligent town councils to provide slum dwellers with basic 
sanitation facilities, released individuals whose pre-trial detentions 
exceeded the maximum penalty for their alleged crimes, and 
compensated women raped by on-duty Indian soldiers.30 In other 
words, public interest litigation has unarguably been thought of as a 
vehicle for advancing equality and affirmative rights, and in many 
instances it’s—also unarguably—been successful in this mission.  
 Besides raw outcomes, the good vibes surrounding public 
interest litigation also emanate from a sense that the Supreme Court 
only devised the approach (and PIL petitioners only continue to use 
it) out of sheer necessity. Governmental malfunction is a 
longstanding theme in Indian politics, especially at the federal level. 
Indeed, “malfunction” is a kind of extreme euphemism for much of 
what happens in New Delhi: 34% of sitting Lok Sabha members face 
criminal charges,31 the last ten years alone have seen a number of 
scandals with price tags between USD $30–40 billion a piece,32 and 
the current Prime Minister was under criminal investigation as late as 
2012 in connection with the mass killing of Muslims in his state 
during his chief ministership. 33  In 2015, India ranked #76 on 
                                                
29 Jasper Vikas George, Public Interest Litigation: Social Change and Public Interest 
Litigation in India, NGOSINDIA.COM (Aug. 3, 2005), 
http://www.ngosindia.com/resources/pil_sc.php. 
30 Ratlam Municipality v. Vardhichand, AIR 1980 SC 1622; Hussainara Khatoon v. 
State of Bihar (I to VI) 1 SCC 81 (1980); Delhi Domestic Working Women’s 
Forum v. Union of India, 1 SCC 14 (1995). 
31 The Lok Sabha is the lower house of Parliament. Rukmini S., 16th Lok Sabha will 
be richest, have most MPs with criminal charges, THE HINDU (May 19, 2014), 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/16th-lok-sabha-will-be-richest-have-
most-mps-with-criminal-charges/article6022513.ece (noting that this represents an 
increase from 30% in 2009 and 24% in 2004). 
32 Beina Xu, Governance in India: Corruption, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/corruption-and-bribery/governance-india-
corruption/p31823 (describing, among others, the 2010-11 “Telecom” scandal with 
an estimated governmental cost of $39 billion, and the 2012 “Coalgate” scandal 
with an estimated cost of $34 billion) 
33 For an overview of the court cases and investigations that was written before 
Narendra Modi became Prime Minister see Anonymous, India: A Decade on, Gujarat 
Justice Incomplete, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 24, 2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/24/india-decade-gujarat-justice-incomplete. 
For an account of investigation efforts that have taken place since Modi took 
office, and of the harassment endured by the investigators, see David Barstow, 
Longtime Critic of Modi is Now a Target, NYTIMES.COM (Aug. 19, 2015), 
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Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (between 
Burkina Faso and Thailand), which is actually an improvement over 
its 2013 performance (#94).34 Matters had reached such a peak by 
early 2011 that an activist named Anna Hazare gained significant 
political traction for the idea of a “people’s ombudsman” with 
independent prosecutorial authority and police powers over virtually 
the entire federal government (the bill, fittingly, got stuck in 
Parliament).35 There’s even a small but identifiable genre of anti-
corruption cinema that is equal parts fantasy and self-flagellation.36 
All of this has rather understandably fed into strong support 
for public interest litigation. While the federal judiciary’s halo has 
lately gotten a bit tarnished, the courts still enjoy a reputation for 
intent and efficacy that vastly outstrips anything the executive or 
legislative branches could hope for.37 This reputational advantage, 
combined with the very real failures of the other branches and the 
very real success of early PIL cases, has led supporters of public 
interest litigation to argue that the courts merely step in to put right 
the wrongs committed by other branches. 38  Some commentators 
                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/asia/teesta-setalvad-modi-
india.html. 
34 Transparency International, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2015, 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads (last visited Feb. 20, 2016); Xu, 
supra note 32 (citing Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions 
Index).  
35 See, e.g., Sumanta Banerjee, Anna Hazare, Civil Society, and the State, 46 ECON. & 
POL. WEEKLY 12 (2011). 
36 For a tiny slice of this genre See, e.g., INDIAN (Sri Surya Movies 1996) and 
MUTHALVAN (S Pictures 1999) (both Tamil) as well as RANG DE BASANTI 
(Rakeysh Omprakash Mehra Pictures 2006), NO ONE KILLED JESSICA (UTV 
Spotboy 2011), and SATYAGRAHA (Prakash Jha Productions 2013) (all Hindi, with 
SATYAGRAHA being explicitly inspired by Anna Hazare). 
37 The federal judiciary did not always enjoy such high esteem—indeed, the 
development of public interest litigation was closely tied to the courts’ fall from 
grace during Indira Gandhi’s Emergency of 1975–77. Upendra Baxi, The Avatars of 
Indian Judicial Activism: Explorations in the Geographies of [In]Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA: ITS GRASP AND REACH 157 (S.K. Verma & 
Kusum eds., 2000). And the judiciary’s reputation has suffered a bit recently thanks 
to allegations of corrupt personal finances, case-fixing, and irregular promotion 
practices. See Manoj Mitta, A few just men who raised the bar, TIMES OF INDIA (May 16, 
2010), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-toi/special-report/A-
few-just-men-who-raised-the-bar/articleshow/5936089.cms; Shoma Chaudhry, 
Half of the Last 16 Chief Justices Were Corrupt, TEHELKA.COM (Sept. 5, 2009), 
http://www.tehelka.com/story_main42.asp?filename=Ne050909half_of.asp. 
38 Gobind Das, The Supreme Court: An Overview, in SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 17 (B.N. Kirpal et al eds., 
2008) (“Faced with a liberal and enlightened executive it sought to cooperate with 
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even maintain that given certain procedural aspects of public interest 
litigation (non-adversarial engagement, ongoing investigation, 
periodic reporting), courts are actually compensating for the lack of a 
“genuine deliberative forum” in the legislature.39 At the very least, 
many supporters of public interest litigation suggest that the other 
branches’ failure to realize the substantive ends of democracy makes 
them no more representative as institutions than the unelected but 
populist judiciary.40 In other words, the classic and still dominant 
view is that public interest litigation is good on both principled and 
consequentialist grounds. 
Recently, however, the veneer has started to peel. Several 
commentators argue that public interest litigation simply doesn’t 
protect disadvantaged citizens the way it used to.41 For one thing, 
there have been a series of landmark cases whose outcomes favored 
corporate or urban middle-class interests over those of more 
vulnerable populations: the “dam” cases, in which thousands of tribal 
and poor rural communities were displaced to further development 
projects; the “relocation” cases, in which polluting industries (and the 
migrant workers who depended on them) were moved outside city 
limits; and the “gentrification” cases, in which thousands (sometimes 
hundreds of thousands) of low-income residents and slum dwellers 
were evicted from their homes pursuant to urban beautification 
projects.42 The language of these newer decisions has been harsher, 
                                                                                                         
it, confronted with an aggressive and bellicose one the courts stepped aside, and 
when the executive was weak or negligent the courts were obliged to step in to 
ensure that the needs of the people were met.”). 
39 Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Evaluating contemporary criticisms of ‘Public Interest 
Litigation’: A progressive conception of the role of a Judge 31-33 (2009) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author); SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE DUTIES 149 (2008). 
40 Madhav Godbole, Good Governance: A Distant Dream, 39 ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL WEEKLY 1103 (2004); Soli Sorabjee, The Ideal Remedy: A Valediction, in 
THE SUPREME COURT VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION: A CHALLENGE TO 
FEDERALISM 209 (Pran Chopra ed. 2006) (“You may say that this is not the 
function of the court. But look at [it] in the larger context. Look at the relief that it 
has provided to this neglected segment of humanity… I would say that with all its 
deficiencies, the Supreme Court has been the protector of the Fundamental Rights 
of the people.”).  
41 For criticisms of the “conservative” turn in public interest litigation, see generally, 
Surya Deva, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Critical Review, 28 CIV. JUST. Q. 19 
(2009); Shubhankar Dam, Vineet Narain v. Union of India: A Court of Law and Not 
Justice: Is the Indian Supreme Court Bound by the Indian Constitution?, 2005 PUB. L. 239 
(2005).  
42 For a discussion of these case types, see generally, Thiruvengadam, Swallowing a 
Bitter PIL?, supra note 25; Gautam Bhan, “This is no longer the city I once knew”: 
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too. In the gentrification cases, for instance, individuals who used to 
be “pavement dwellers” became “encroacher[s]” and their presence 
on public lands went from symbolizing their necessity and the state’s 
failure to their thievery and opportunism relative to upstanding, pay-
your-own-way homeowners.43  
 Lest they be accused of cherry-picking, critics of current PIL 
jurisprudence also point to preliminary quantitative studies that 
suggest these landmark disappointments are representative rather 
than anomalous outcomes.44 When it comes to PIL cases dealing with 
Fundamental Rights claims, it seems that “claimants from advantaged 
classes have higher win rates than claimants not from advantaged 
classes”—and, moreover, that the disparity between win rates has 
been increasing over time.45 To be sure, there are problems with 
relying on quantitative studies to show change over time in PIL 
jurisprudence: early PIL cases are harder to access and classify, while 
self-selection out of the court system may mean that decreasing win 
rates reflect declining merit rather than changing judicial 
sympathies.46 But the quantitative analyses of public interest litigation 
are rapidly closing in on these issues and the prognosis still does not 
                                                                                                         
Evictions, the urban poor, and the right to the city in millennial Delhi, 21 ENVT’ & 
URBANIZATION 127, 134 (2009) (noting that the 2004 Pushta eviction in Delhi 
displaced nearly 150,000 people). 
43 Bhan, supra note 42, at 134-35 (comparing language from early PIL displacement 
cases with language in comparable cases from 2000 onwards).  
44 Gauri, Public Interest Litigation in India, supra note 24; SHANKAR, SCALING 
JUSTICE, supra note 24; Shukla, Rights of the Poor, supra note 24.  
45 Gauri, supra note 24, at 13: 
…advantaged class claimants had a 73% probability of winning a 
Fundamental Rights claim for cases in which an order or decision was 
rendered from years 2000-2008, whereas the win rate for claimants not 
from advantaged classes for the same years was 47%. For the 1990s, rates 
were 68% and 47%, respectively. But in the years prior to 1990, claimants 
not from advantaged classes enjoyed higher success rates than those from 
advantaged classes. The differences for the 1990s and 2000s are 
significantly different from each other, based on a simple chi-square test 
and a simple probit estimation  
46 Jayanth K. Krishnan, Social Policy Advocacy and the Role of the Courts in India, 21 AM. 
ASIAN REV. 91 (2003) (arguing that social policy advocates who work on behalf of 
marginalized communities are less and less likely to use the courts because the 
judiciary is so backlogged). It’s unclear whether the change in PIL cases is due to 
transformation in the type of case brought or type of case won, or both—or a 
change in the reporting and categorizing practices of the Court. See, e.g., Gauri, 
Public Interest Litigation in India, supra note 24, at 8 (“there appears to have been a 
change in the nature of issues being brought to the Court through PILs”) and at 5 
(stating that the “apparent increase in the share of advantaged litigants” may be “an 
artifact of a change in reporting practices on the part of the Court”). 
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look good.  
All of this is to say that whether one considers case studies or 
sky view analysis even supporters of public interest litigation tend to 
feel that “the Supreme Court in the 1990s and in the current 
decade[s] is refusing to enforce rights which the Court of the 1980s 
would have.”47 The successful PIL petitioner today is increasingly 
likely to be a middle-class individual speaking up on her own behalf 
about the state’s failures in areas like corruption, pollution, and 
gender equality.48 These are all worthwhile issues and they are in 
keeping with the Court’s broader shift towards a  “good governance” 
role.49 Still, they are a far cry from the concerns of migrant and 
bonded laborers, child workers, incarcerated under-trials, slum 
dwellers, and wards of state who were the targets of early era PIL 
cases, and whose problems by and large still need addressing.50 It is 
increasingly not the case that public interest litigation is a “last resort 
for the oppressed and the bewildered.”51 
 Unsurprisingly, then, current conversations about public 
interest litigation are preoccupied with how to regroup and reverse 
course. One suggestion has been that judges should step back from 
the “command and control” model of judicial proceedings that has 
come to characterize PIL cases over the last two decades and adopt a 
more “facilitative” role—or, in American legal lingo, that judges 
should function as mediators when they hear PIL suits.52 Another 
idea is that the Supreme Court should “evolve a set of guidelines for 
restrained and responsible PIL” so that the process regains legitimacy 
and the outcomes are more mindful of third-party effects on 
marginalized communities.53  
                                                
47 Thiruvengadam, supra note 25, at 522. 
48 S. Muralidhar, Public Interest Litigation, 33-34 ANN. SURVEY INDIAN L. 525, 563 
(1997-98) (“The cases that were taken up for detailed consideration by the courts 
[and decided in 1997-98] reflected a perceptible shift to issues concerning 
governance.”). 
49 Robinson, supra note 19, at 2 (arguing that the Court has justified its development 
of Basic Structure Doctrine and a broad right to life jurisprudence “with not only a 
wide reading of the Indian Constitution, but also an appeal to broad, almost 
metaphysical, principles of “civilization” or good governance.” 
50 See Usha Ramanathan, Of Judicial Power, FRONTLINE.IN (Mar. 16–29, 2002), 
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1906/19060300.htm. 
51 State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, 3 S.C.C. 634, 670 (1979), cited in Lavanya 
Rajamani, Public Interest Environmental Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access, 
Participation, Equity, Effectiveness, and Sustainability, 19 J. ENVTL L. 293 (2007).  
52 Thiruvengadam, supra note 25. 
53 Rajamani, supra note 51, at 321. 
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The very idea of “fixing” public interest litigation suggests 
that it can be refashioned in such a way as to once more reliably 
produce the kind of progressive results achieved during its 
introductory phase. Of course, few if any current commentators 
would argue that public interest litigation, even if properly reformed, 
would inevitably produce progressive results and some are actively 
opposed to the idea.54 (I say current commentators because this was 
and perhaps continues to be a popular view among an older 
generation of lawyers and legal scholars.55) But even trying to fix 
public interest litigation to produce mostly progressive reforms is like 
trying to read only half the Indian Constitution, and it deserves a 
similar response: that’s just not how it works.  
This is not to say that I’m advocating the other extreme—
abandoning public interest litigation as a hopelessly lost cause—
which some commentators have proposed and which particularly 
upsetting outcomes like the one in Koushal might tempt us to do.56 
That’s as dispiriting and unnecessary as some of the proposals to fix 
public interest litigation are logistically and politically unrealistic. But 
before we get to what the shift in PIL jurisprudence really tells us 
about Indian law and governance going forward, it’s worth 
considering the stakes a little more deeply. What do the arguments 
for or against public interest litigation tell us about law and 
democracy in India? How can such a miniscule body of case law (PIL 
suits account for less than 0.5% of the Supreme Court’s docket57) not 
                                                
54 Thiruvengadam, supra note 25, at 525 (criticizing Upendra Baxi for seemingly 
suggesting that “the text of the Indian Constitution inexorably points to 
progressive ends, ignoring the reality that there can be several conflicting 
interpretations of what exactly the constitutional values are and, more importantly, 
how they are to be achieved”). 
55 Sorabjee, supra note 40, at 209 (admonishing readers to “criticize [public interest 
litigation] when it goes wrong” but “not question the premise on which it works”); 
Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of 
India, 4 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 126 (1985) (arguing that public interest 
litigation “symbolizes the politics of liberation”). 
56 See, e.g., Nivedita Menon, Environment and the Will to Rule: The Supreme Court and 
Public Interest Litigation in the 1990s, in THE SHIFTING SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE 
SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA (Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain, 
eds., 2014); Aditya Nigam, Embedded Judiciary: Or the Judicial State of Exception?, in 
THE SHIFTING SCALES OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN NEO-LIBERAL INDIA 
(Mayur Suresh & Siddharth Narrain, eds., 2014).  
57 Gauri, supra note 24, at 10 (arguing that “on average, some 0.4% of ‘cases’ before 
the Court involve PILs”); Nick Robinson, Too Many Cases, 26 FRONTLINE 1 (Jan. 3-
16, 2009), 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2601/stories/200901162
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only speak to profoundly important aspects of social life but to the 
very foundation of democratic governance? For these questions and 
more, we need to take a brief detour into the recent Delhi High 
Court and Supreme Court decisions on sodomy.  
II. NAZ AND KOUSHAL 
 
 Naz and Koushal are big cases, widely discussed. Commentary 
and scholarship on the two decisions is understandably vast in India 
but the cases’ influence has by no means been geographically limited. 
In the U.S., for instance, the New York Times greeted Naz with an op-
ed triumphantly announcing that an “Indian Court Overturns Gay 
Sex Ban.”58 Similarly, in the 26 months since Koushal was handed 
down, 13 articles and notes discussing it have been published in 
American law journals (to say nothing of Indian or international law 
journals). 59  And across continents and publication venues, the 
reviews uniformly celebrate Naz and excoriate Koushal. This section is 
not directed towards challenging that assessment: if there is nothing 
to like in Koushal’s substantive outcome there is considerably less to 
applaud in what passes for judicial reasoning in the opinion. 
Moreover, the reasoning in either case is not especially relevant to the 
larger arguments of this paper concerning shifts in public interest 
litigation and dynamic equilibrium in the Indian Constitution. But 
because it is impossible to discuss a case without actually discussing 
the case, this section will first briefly overview the facts and 
arguments in Naz and Koushal before placing the decisions in the 
broader context of PIL jurisprudence. 
                                                                                                         
60108100.htm (arguing that “contrary to popular belief… [PILs] have one of 
the court’s lowest acceptance rates” and observing that in 2006 “the [C]ourt 
received almost 20,000 letter or postcard petitions… that could be considered as 
PIL” but that “only 243 of these 20,000 pleas were even placed before the judges 
to be considered for admission (out of which only a small fraction then made it to 
regular hearing)”). 
58 Heather Timmons & Hari Kumar, Indian Court Overturns Gay Sex Ban, 
NYTIMES.COM (July 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03india.html?_r=0. 
59 These results are based on search of the legal database LexisAdvance using the 
following string: “Naz Foundation” narrowed by Secondary Materials search within 
“Koushal” (Feb. 21, 2016). 
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A. Public Morality, Constitutional Morality, and Feigned Deference 
The named petitioner in Naz Foundation v. Gov’t of NCT of 
Delhi was an NGO that concentrates on HIV/AIDS awareness and 
support in India.60 The Foundation filed a PIL petition to have § 377 
of the Indian Penal Code read down because the Foundation’s work 
with men who have sex with men (MSM) suggested that the 
criminalization of sodomy makes MSM reluctant to cooperate with 
HIV/AIDs efforts.61 Other petitioners joined the effort, including 
the national Ministry of Health and Welfare and an umbrella group 
called “Voices Against § 377 IPC.”62 The respondents included the 
Ministry of Home Affairs as well as an activist organization called the 
Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK) and a private individual named 
B.K. Singhal.63  
The Naz petitioners challenged the constitutionality of § 377 
under Article 14 (equal protection), Article 15 (prohibition of, among 
other things, sex discrimination), 19 (free speech and expression), and 
Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty).64 They also argued 
that the Indian Penal Code’s condemnation of homosexuality was 
outdated and not in keeping with Indian culture.65 But rather than ask 
for the provision to be struck down entirely, the petitioners asked 
that § 377 be read down to only criminalize penile-non-vaginal sex 
when it is non-consensual or involves a minor.66  
For the most part, the Delhi High Court hung its hat on three 
constitutional arguments. First, the court held that the Indian 
Constitution indirectly supports a fundamental right to privacy that is 
linked to persons not places, as well as a right to a dignified life, and 
                                                
60 NAZ INDIA, http://nazindia.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). 
61 Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 6. 
62 Id. at 13, 17. 
63 Id. at 10-13, 21. JACK campaigns against recognition of any causal connection 
between HIV and AIDS, as well as against the use of anti-retroviral drugs. Anju 
Singh, Making Waves, Changing Tides: The Story of Joint Action Council Kannur (JACK), 
India, FREEREPUBLIC.COM (Nov. 13, 2001), 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/569758/posts. The late B.P. Singhal 
was a former Director General of Police and Rajya Sabha member for the right-
wing Bharatiya Janata Party. Shivam Vij, BP Singhal: “I don’t have any problem with 
homosexuals. Do you?” KAFILA (July 9, 2009), http://kafila.org/2009/07/09/bp-
singhal-i-dont-have-any-problem-with-homosexuals-do-you/.  
64 Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 2. 
65 Id. at 27, 75-76. 
66 Id. at 10 (submitting that “that there is a case for consensual sexual intercourse 
(of the kind mentioned above; i.e. homosexual) between two willing adults in 
privacy to be saved and excepted from the penal provision contained in Section 
377 IPC”). 
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that both rights require protection for private consensual sex acts 
between adults (the Article 21 argument). Second, it held that even if 
§ 377 reflects popular morality concerning sodomy, popular morality 
alone does not constitute the kind of compelling state interest that’s 
required to restrict a fundamental right (the Article 14 argument). 
And third, the court held that “sex” includes “sexual orientation” for 
the purposes of equal protection analysis (the Article 15 argument). 
The decision also touched on several other issues—for instance, the 
High Court’s privacy reasoning was tied to arguments about 
autonomy and substantive due process, while its “compelling state 
interest” analysis relied heavily on U.S. jurisprudence on strict 
scrutiny.  
Many commentators praised the High Court’s argument that 
expressions of public morality via the law are still subject to an 
overarching “constitutional morality.” 67  Others emphasized the 
expansion of “sex” to include “sexual orientation,”68 while still others 
called Naz’s subtle re-reading of privacy protection its “most 
attractive feature.”69 It’s worth noting that there are a decent number 
of problems with the legal analysis in Naz and that not all of the 
arguments that could have been made were made (or at least, not all 
of them were made well).70 But overall, both the outcome and the 
reasoning have been widely celebrated. 
                                                
67 Gautam Bhatia, The Unbearable Wrongness of Koushal vs Naz, OUTLOOK (Dec. 11, 
2013), http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/the-unbearable-wrongness-
of-koushal-vs-naz/288823; Rohit Sharma, The Public and Constitutional Morality 
Conundrum: A Case-Note on the Naz Foundation Judgement, 2 NAT’L U. JURID. STUD. 
445 (2009). See also Martha C. Nussbaum, Disgust or Equality? Sexual Orientation and 
Indian Law, 6 INDIAN J. L. & SOC’Y (forthcoming 2016), at 21 (“given that the claim 
of public morality is the central such claim, showing that the interest in 
criminalising consensual gay sex acts is actually motivated by disgust and stigma 
helps to establish the constitutional unsuitability of the interest, in a nation 
committee to equality”) (on file with author). 
68 Bret Boyce, Sexuality and Gender Identity Under the Constitution of India, 18 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 39 (2015). 
69 Vikram Raghavan, Navigating the Noteworthy and the Nebulous in Naz Foundation, 2 
NAT’L U. JURID. STUD. 396, 403 (2009). 
70 Martha Nussbaum, Sex Equality, Liberty, and Privacy: A Comparative Approach to the 
Feminist Critique, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, 
CONTROVERSIES 242 (Zoya Hassan et al. eds., 2004) (critiquing the use of privacy 
arguments for the purposes of advancing gender justice), cited in Raghavan, supra 
note 69, at 405; Pritam Baruah, Logic and Coherence in Naz Foundation: The Arguments 
of Non-Discrimination, Privacy, and Dignity, 2 NAT’L U. JURID. STUD. 504 (2009) 
(arguing that the cases cited by the Court do not support the idea that sex 
discrimination encompasses sexual orientation discrimination, and that Naz 
inadequately defined the concepts of privacy and autonomy). 
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Conversely, Suresh Kumar Koushal v. Naz Foundation has 
inspired little besides anger and ridicule. The named petitioner, an 
astrologer, filed one of the many PIL suits challenging Naz on 
broadly religious or cultural grounds that were eventually 
consolidated for consideration by the Supreme Court.71 The actual 
petitioners in Koushal included several “public spirited” individuals 
(including B.P. Singhal of Naz fame), two small political parties, a 
Keralite church alliance, JACK (also a Naz participant), the All India 
Muslim Personal Law Board, and a government entity called the 
Delhi Commission for the Protection of Child Rights.72  
The Koushal petitioners argued, among other things, that the 
High Court’s findings of fact as to the harms caused by § 377 were 
insufficient—in other words, that there wasn’t enough proof that the 
provision discouraged people from seeking HIV/AIDS support or 
that it caused privacy or dignity harms.73 They also challenged Naz’s 
holding that § 377 discriminates against homosexuals as a class and 
that sex discrimination encompasses sexual orientation 
discrimination.74 Several petitioners also made variants of a claim that 
the High Court had violated the separation of powers by failing to 
defer to the will of Parliament and, by extension, to the existence of a 
public morality that condemns same-sex acts.75 
 There’s not much in the way of original reasoning in 
Koushal, 76  but subsequent commentators have teased out the 
following arguments from Justice Singhvi’s decidedly minimalist 
analysis: (1) § 377’s prohibition of sodomy is presumptively 
constitutional because the Indian Penal Code was duly enacted (in 
1860) and remains unamended; (2) this presumption of 
constitutionality stands because the High Court did not establish that 
sufficiently severe harms are inflicted upon sufficiently numerous 
people in the course of “valid” efforts to enforce the provision; (3) 
people who engage in carnal intercourse against “against the order of 
                                                
71 Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013), at 15-20. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 21-22. 
74 Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 10972 (2013), at 21-23. 
75 Id. at 26 (argument by the All India Muslim Personal Law Board (AIMPLB) that 
“so long as the law stands on the statute book, there was a constitutional 
presumption in its favour”); id. at 25 (argument by the Kranthikari Manuvadi 
Morcha Party that “the matter should have been left to Parliament to decide as to 
what is moral and what is immoral and whether the section in question should be 
retained in the statute book”). 
76 Nussbaum, supra note 67, at 24 (observing that “[a]s for law, there is almost 
nothing there”). 
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nature” are a different class such that different laws can be applied 
against them without constitutional difficulty.  
Needless to say, there are problems with this—not because 
there was no plausible argument to be made for reversing the Delhi 
High Court, but because Koushal contained virtually no argument at 
all. Most of the Supreme Court’s review of Naz is perplexing or just 
plain wrong, so that all that is seemingly left coherent in Koushal is the 
bare argument of judicial deference to legislative acts. Deference, of 
course, is a perfectly legitimate ground for declining to invalidate a 
law even in the relatively deference-thin context of the Indian federal 
judiciary. But in the absence of any real attempt to grapple with the 
issues (and the presence of page after page of block quotations 
cribbed from other judges’ efforts at grappling), the Koushal Court’s 
deference appears to be nothing so much as a small and rather 
transparent fig leaf. 
Having said all this, my intent is not to demonstrate why 
Koushal is a bad decision since it has been pretty thoroughly picked 
apart by many excellent commentators. Indeed, for our purposes, 
Naz and Koushal are interesting not because they are exemplars of legal 
reasoning or the lack thereof, but because they exemplify different 
trends in public interest litigation. To see why, we need to step back 
from the opinions and focus instead on the litigants and issues.  
B. Competing Public Interests  
  Detached from § 377 and the criminalization of sodomy, Naz 
and Koushal are easily recognizable as examples of “classic” and 
“contemporary” PIL suits. Consider the moving parties: Naz was 
brought by a coalition of progressive-minded civil society actors and 
sympathetic government subsidiaries, while Koushal was brought by a 
coalition of individual litigants and community organizations—
religious rather than residential, perhaps, but community 
organizations nonetheless.77 Or take the underlying goals of the suits 
                                                
77 See, e.g., Almitra H. Patel v. Union of India, 2 S.C.C. 416 (1998) (asking the Court 
to require the Delhi government to address air and water pollution caused by 
untreated solid wastes); Bangalore Medical Trust v. B. S Muddappa, A.I.R. 1991 
S.C. 1902 (regarding the State of Karnataka’s decision to lease land intended for a 
public park to a company for the purpose of building a nursing home). The latter 
opinion really demonstrates the turn to middle-class interests and a vision of the 
state as agent rather than sovereign: “…in a democratic set up the people or 
community being sovereign, the exercise of discretion must be guided by the 
inherent philosophy that the exerciser of discretion is accountable for his action…” 
and “[p]ublic park as a place reserved for beauty and recreation is associated with 
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according to the moving parties (rather than according to the courts). 
The original writ petition submitted by the Naz Foundation in 2001 
repeatedly references social attitudes and affirmative rights—“self-
respect and dignity” on the one hand, and “doctrinaire and 
outmoded conception[s] of sexual relations” on the other. 78 
Conversely, the key Koushal petitioners explained their motivations 
primarily using the language of religious or cultural protection and 
judicial deference.79 And finally, remember for whom the moving 
parties were acting: marginalized and scorned minorities in Naz, 
versus themselves and similarly situated citizens in Koushal.  
  Seen in this light, Naz is clearly the archetype of the classic 
PIL suit in which philanthropic third-parties fight to change Indian 
society by defending or expanding the rights of disadvantaged 
groups. And just as surely—though perhaps not as clearly—Koushal is 
emblematic of a more contemporary PIL suit in which parties who 
are actually motivated by a sense of personal harm fight to hold the 
state up to its obligations as the agent of a sovereign, rights-bearing 
democratic citizenry.  
  Interestingly, and despite their focus on religious and cultural 
protection, there’s no reason to think the Koushal petitioners drew on 
                                                                                                         
growth of the concept of equality and recognition of importance of common 
man.” Bangalore Medical Trust, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 1902, at 109. 
78 Naz Foundation, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7455 (2001), at 6 (“unless the self-
respect and dignity of sexuality minorities is restored by doing away with 
discriminatory laws such as Section 377, it will not be possible to promote 
HIV/AIDS prevention”), and at 12 (“Section 377 is indeed based upon a 
doctrinaire and outmoded conception of sexual relations, which has later been used 
to legitimize discrimination against sexuality minorities”) available at 
http://www.lawyerscollective.org/vulnerable-communities/lgbt/section-377.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
79 See, e.g., the argument of the Trust God Missionaries, Koushal, Civil Appeal No. 
10972 (2013), at 25 (“if the declaration made by the High Court is approved, then 
India’s social structure and the institution of marriage will be detrimentally affected 
and young persons will be tempted towards homosexual activities”); the argument 
of the AIMPLB, id. at 26 (“[c]ourts, by their very nature, should not undertake the 
task of legislating”); Some of the Koushal petitioners also appealed to child 
protection and the non-absolute nature of all rights: see the argument of Suresh 
Kumar Koushal, id. at 27 (“all fundamental rights operate in a square of reasonable 
restrictions”); Pallavi Polanki, Why Delhi Child Rights Commission Opposed De-
criminalization of Gay Sex, FIRSTPOST.COM (Dec. 14, 2013), 
http://www.firstpost.com/india/why-delhi-child-rights-commission-opposed-de-
criminalisation-of-gay-sex-1286883.html (observing that “[i]n the last 150 years, 
there have been only 200 cases were this section has been effectively applied,” that 
“[a]ll those cases applied to sodomy and in more than 90 per cent of the cases, the 
victims were minors,” before concluding that “the application of the Section 377 
was to protect victims”). 
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§ 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code.80 To be sure, § 295(A) punishes 
“deliberate and malicious” action that offends religious beliefs—it 
would translate to something like a criminal charge of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (for religion) in the American 
context—and it seems ludicrous to think of Naz Foundation 
members being imprisoned or otherwise subject to criminal liability 
for their advocacy and social work.81 But there remains a troubling 
potential for overlap between § 295(A) and § 377 as against LGBT 
individuals, so that (especially given the wide and frequently specious 
net cast by the Koushal petitioners and Court) an argument combining 
the two IPC sections wouldn’t have seemed wholly out of place.  
  It’s true that Koushal stands somewhat apart from the new 
model of PIL suits inasmuch as it focuses on religion, culture, and 
morality claims rather than on economic or good governance 
demands. But this difference does not fundamentally change the fact 
that Koushal, like many of the contemporary PIL suits decried by 
court-watchers and legal scholars, emphasizes the state’s duty to be a 
good agent (meaning a good agent of the petitioners) rather than a 
good reformer. While it’s always risky to indulge in post-facto 
speculation regarding litigation strategies, the most plausible 
explanation for the fact that Koushal omitted any § 295(A) 
arguments might simply be that petitioners and judges alike 
recognized the approach’s political weakness, or that the credibility of 
PIL suits depends on the petitioners’ ability to demonstrate that they 
“have no personal, political or financial interest of any kind in the 
public interest litigation brought.”82   
  It also doesn’t matter that the outcome sought by the Koushal 
petitioners may be fundamentally distasteful in a way that preferring 
parks over nursing homes is not. The fact that Koushal stands apart 
from many other “contemporary” PIL suits (to say nothing of 
“classic” ones) in its espousal of a social conservative rather than a 
neo-liberal morality just goes to show that public interest litigation is 
incapable of returning consistently progressive or even consistently 
non-progressive results. Indeed, this point is being made with growing 
frequency by the commentators discussed in Part I. But what isn’t 
                                                
80 Indian Penal Code (Act No. 45 of 1860), § 295–298 (prohibiting harms to 
religious sentiments under various circumstances). The Koushal opinion itself makes 
no reference to § 295, and this element of the statute does not seem to figure in 
public conversations (including those emphasizing the petitioners’ point of view). 
81 Naz Foundation, after all, would not even be in a position analogous to the 
doctors in Griswold who were subject to criminal liability for prescribing 
contraceptives. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
82 Susman, supra note 16, at 70 (emphasis mine). 
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being said is that—notwithstanding specific outcomes like Naz and 
Koushal—the fact that public interest litigation gets deployed to 
inconsistent ends is a reflection of something fundamental and 
fundamentally good in the Indian Constitution.  
III. DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM IN PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
  If Naz and Koushal represent the great divide that supporters 
of public interest litigation are anxious to address, why does this leave 
us with anything save a whole lot of bad? After all, Indian law and 
politics are strikingly concerned with social uplift.83 Why isn’t it cause 
for disappointment when a once-celebrated path to progressive ends 
turns out to lead elsewhere as well? The answer is simply that Indian 
law and politics—we can even go so far as to say Indian 
constitutionalism and democracy—were never meant to exclusively 
pursue aspirational goals. That they are meant to pursue such goals is 
beyond question. Nevertheless, as I’ve argued elsewhere, this support 
for government-driven societal reform coexists with contrasting (and 
constitutionally defined) political values. 84  Indian jurisprudence, 
including public interest litigation, properly reflects the constant 
recalibration between these different visions of state-society relations.  
  Briefly put, the two underlying impulses in this 
constitutionally enshrined dynamic equilibrium correspond to two 
understandings of democratic sovereignty. On the one hand, the 
Indian Constitution is “first and foremost a social document” and a 
“majority of its provisions are either directly aimed at furthering the 
goals of the social revolution or attempt to foster this revolution by 
establishing the conditions necessary for its achievement.”85 In this 
“militant” vision of democratic ordering, the state exercises far more 
                                                
83 See, e.g., the comment of a prominent Supreme Court advocate that the 
“Constitution of India is very much focused on social change. And so we as 
citizens, as lawyers, whenever we look at a program or whenever we criticize a 
program, we have this one test in front of us: how is it going to advance social 
justice?” Indira Jaising, Case in Point: Challenges to Rule of Law and Gender 
Equality Globally (Feb. 16, 2016, at 19:32-48), 
http://caseinpoint.org/live/news/5879-challenges-to-rule-of-law-and-gender-
equality#.VtH6h0tSxuZ. 
84 Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, supra note 10; Deepa Das Acevedo, Celibate Gods 
and “Essential Practices” Jurisprudence at Sabarimala, 1991-2011, in FILING RELIGION: 
STATE, HINDUISM, AND COURTS OF LAW 101 (Daniella Berti et al, eds.,, 2016); 
Deepa Das Acevedo, Religion, Law, and the Making of a Liberal Indian State ch. 1 
(2013) (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago) (on file with author). 
85 GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A 
NATION 50 (1999). 
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than the discretionary authority we might ordinarily expect of an 
agent or representative—for example, it can regulate anything 
touching the “secular aspects of religion.” (It can also regulate a great 
deal touching the religious aspects of religion, but that’s beyond the 
scope of this paper.)  
  Indeed, many of the Constitution’s provisions and the 
practices they give rise to reflect an explicitly articulated worry that 
Indian citizens are not yet capable of fully exercising their authority 
as democratic sovereigns. Take, for example, the concerns of some 
drafters—eventually reflected in constitutional prose—that unlimited 
individual freedoms would hamper the state’s ability to reform 
society. 86  Or consider Justice Bhagwati’s worry that the average 
Indian’s religious beliefs would, if unchecked and unchanged, 
encourage a whole host of violent and discriminatory practices.87 (It’s 
worth noting that Bhagwati was one of the Supreme Court justices 
who created public interest litigation.) Basic structure doctrine too 
reflects a mistrust of untrammelled popular democracy, inasmuch as 
it places the undefined “essential features” of the Constitution 
beyond parliamentary revision (although admittedly India’s founding 
document is far more open to amendment than its un-entrenched 
American counterpart).88  
                                                
86 Id. at 64 (describing Amrit Kaur and A.K. Ayyar’s views that the freedom of 
religion and equality before the law should be worded so that they did not interfere 
with the state’s mission to transform social relations). See also Sathe, who writes 
that “Many Indian leaders who had made sacrifices for national independence were 
of the view that the legislature should be supreme… However this view was not 
unanimously accepted. Persons representing the minorities were apprehensive of 
the majoritarian rule implicit in such an arrangement. They wanted greater say for 
the courts.” SATHE, supra note 7, at 3 
87 P.N. Bhagwati, Religion and Secularism Under the Indian Constitution, in RELIGION 
AND LAW IN INDEPENDENT INDIA 35, 43 (Robert D. Baird, ed., 2005) (stating that 
India’s constitutional framers “knew that, left to itself, religion could permit 
orthodox men to burn widows alive on the piers [sic] of their deceased husbands… 
could encourage and in its own subtle ways, even coerce indulgence in social evils 
like child marriage or even crimes like human sacrifice or it could consign women 
to the perpetual fate of devadasis or relegate large sections of humanity to the sub-
human status of untouchability and inferiority”).  
88 The basic structure doctrine was first announced in Kesavananda Bharati v. State 
of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461. For a useful overview of Kesavananda and the basic 
structure doctrine, see David Gwynn Morgan, The Indian ‘Essential Features’ Case, 30 
THE INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 2 (1981), and Pratap 
Bhanu Mehta, The Inner Conflict of Constitutionalism: Judicial Review and the ‘Basic 
Structure’, in INDIA’S LIVING CONSTITUTION: IDEAS, PRACTICES, CONTROVERSIES 
179 ( Zoya Hasan et al eds., 2005). For a more detailed study see SUDHIR 
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  In light of all this, any suggestion that Indian democracy is 
straightforwardly founded on the idea of citizen sovereignty has more 
holes than Swiss cheese. It is not merely that India, like all countries, 
operates under a de facto arrangement whereby “elites, not masses, 
govern.”89 It is that the Indian state is meant to have a share in 
sovereign authority so that it can do more than just realize specific 
goods set out in advance by the people being governed. And it is in 
exactly this spirit that classic PIL petitioners and courts set out to 
improve the lives of India’s most marginalized citizens.  
  On the other hand, it would also be incorrect to say that a 
more conventional understanding of democratic sovereignty as 
citizen-sovereignty finds no place in Indian constitutional law or 
practice. The Indian Constitution guards against incursions into the 
private lives of individuals by allowing for classically liberal 
protections like “freedom of conscience and free profession, practice 
and propagation of religion.” 90  B.N. Rau famously campaigned 
against including a (substantive) due process clause in the 
Constitution after his conversations with James Bradley Thayer and 
Felix Frankfurter led him to believe it would be an undemocratic 
check on the legislative process (although this “check” was eventually 
introduced by none other than Justice Bhagwati in Maneka Gandhi v. 
Union of India). 91  Above all else, though, the drafters of the 
Constitution were “intellectually committed to the liberal democratic 
tradition” and the idea that individual adult suffrage as the basis of 
political life was the “sine qua non of independence.”92 
  It is probably harder to recognize this vision of undivided 
citizen sovereignty in contemporary public interest litigation than it is 
to see shared sovereignty in classic PIL cases—and it’s also risky to 
even indirectly imply that citizen sovereignty naturally fits with social 
conservatism or neo-liberal politics. I am only making the first of 
                                                                                                         
KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN INDIA: A STUDY OF 
THE BASIC STRUCTURE DOCTRINE (2009).  
89 THOMAS R. DYE & HARMON ZIEGLER, 14 THE IRONY OF DEMOCRACY: AN 
UNCOMMON INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (14th ed. 2008). 
90 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Part III: Fundamental Rights, art. 25. 
91 A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597. Abhinav Chandrachud, Of Constitutional “Due Process,” 
THEHINDU.COM (May 24, 2010), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/of-
constitutional-due-process/article436586.ece. For a discussion of Thayer and 
Frankfurter’s influence on Rau, see Arvind Elangovan, A Constitutional 
Imagination of India: Sir Benegal Narsing Rau Amidst the Retreat of Liberal 
Idealism, 1910-1950, at 21 (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago); AUSTIN, 
supra note 85, at 103. 
92 Id. at 41, 46 
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these arguments, namely, that contemporary public interest cases 
align with liberal democratic ideas of statehood and personhood as 
these are broadly and conventionally understood. For example, PIL 
petitioners who argue for the municipal maintenance of “common 
spaces” rely on a view of the individual-in-society, with all its 
accompanying baggage about public/private divides, that is decidedly 
and classically liberal.93 PIL petitioners who argue for transparency 
and accountability in governance rely on a view of sovereign 
delegation and agency theory that is decidedly and classically 
democratic.94 And, whatever their particular merits or appeal, PIL 
petitioners who argue for the preservation of religious and cultural 
mores—at least, for their preservation until the legislature says 
otherwise—are relying on liberal democratic conceptions of society 
and sovereignty that also have a place in India’s founding document.  
 
CONCLUSION 
  Saying that Naz and Koushal and public interest litigation all 
reflect a dynamic equilibrium between different visions of sovereignty 
does not by itself establish that having such a dynamic equilibrium is 
good. Nor, for that matter, does it give us much of an idea as to how 
we should proceed—with Koushal, with public interest litigation, or 
with understanding Indian constitutional law more generally. So far I 
have been concerned with making an interpretive argument about 
processes at various levels of law in India, but let me close with a few 
thoughts on what this argument does and does not mean for the way 
forward. 
   First, it most certainly does not mean that progressives 
should like Koushal or that we should stop fighting for broadly left-
center causes. It also does not mean that anyone should denigrate or 
de-emphasize the very real, very aspirational elements of the Indian 
Constitution and of democracy in India. But it does mean that 
progressives shouldn’t respond to the so-called “conservative turn” 
in public interest litigation by throwing up our hands or by 
                                                
93 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1985 S.C.C. (3) 545. 
94 See, e.g., Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1988) 1 S.C.C. 226 (concerning the 
Central Bureau of Investigation’s failure to investigation evidence suggesting that 
high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats were trading government contracts for 
bribes); Common Cause v. Union of India, (1996) 6 S.C.C. 530 (concerning 
allegations that the Minister of State for Petroleum and Gas had improperly allotted 
petrol pump and gas agencies to government officials or their relatives). 
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scrambling for newer, better fixes. Public interest litigation can’t be 
“fixed,” if fixing it means ensuring that it only produces progressive 
outcomes, any more than we can “fix” the Indian Constitution. And 
honestly, it shouldn’t be fixed in this way. The great good sense of 
Indian constitutional law has been its flexibility; its incorporation of 
all kinds of legal traditions in the nation’s charter, its catholicism in 
selecting mechanisms and sources and analytic rubrics when 
interpreting that charter, and its willingness to rewrite the charter 
with the benefit of lessons learned. The dynamic equilibrium between 
different visions of sovereign authority that I have described 
elsewhere and the particular manifestation of that dynamic in public 
interest litigation that I have described here is just one more example 
of the flexibility that has served India more than tolerably well for 
nearly seventy years.  
